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Abstract 
We use a state-level panel data set for the period 1969-2005 to analyze the relative 
importance of profitability (rate of profit) and industrial disputes (man-days lost to all 
industrial disputes per worker) in explaining cross-state variations of manufacturing 
sector performance in India. Using three different measures of manufacturing 
performance – net value added, investment and employment – we find that profitability is 
more significant than industrial disputes in explaining the variation of manufacturing 
sector performance across Indian states.    
Keywords: manufacturing performance, profitability, industrial disputes 
 
JEL Classification: B50, C26, O10 
  
                                                        
1 Acknowledgement: The research for this paper was supported by a Chair’s Summer 
Research Fellowship, Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst. 
 
± Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst. Email: 
akarak@umass.edu  






Economists have often envisaged an important role for the manufacturing sector in the 
structural transformation of an underdeveloped economy. While Lewis (1954) focused on 
the ability of manufacturing to absorb surplus labor from the traditional sector, Kaldor 
(1967) claimed that a fast growth rate of national income can only be achieved if a 
dynamic, fast-growing manufacturing sector leads the way. 2 However, the actual 
experience of the Indian economy is quite different. Immediately after attaining 
independence in 1947, political leaders in India placed a great deal of emphasis on 
planned import-substitution industrialization (ISI) as the motor for economic 
development of the nation. Despite initial success – industrial growth averaged 7.6% per 
annum during the first 3 five-year plans between 1951 and 1966 (Ahluwalia 1991) – 
stagnation in industrial (specifically manufacturing) production set in from the mid-1960s 
onwards (Srinivasan and Narayana 1977; Ahluwalia 1991).3 Although the performance 
of the manufacturing sector improved from the late 1970s and early 1980s onward, the 
recovery was less than spectacular and its contribution to real GDP increased only 
marginally. For example, the share of manufacturing value added in GDP during 1984, 
1994 and 2005 was 14.90%, 16.06% and 17.08% respectively (Kotwal et al. 2011). Thus, 
even the high rates of GDP growth that India achieved during the period 1985-2005 was 
not on account of a dynamic manufacturing sector. Rather, the most significant 
                                                        
2 Although Lewis (1954) speaks throughout of the ‘modern’ as opposed to the ‘traditional’ sector, 
manufacturing is certainly an important component of the modern sector. Moreover, the literature 
on ‘patterns of development’ has consistently emphasized that one of the observed empirical 
patterns is the increasing contribution of manufacturing to both GDP (in value added terms) as 
well as employment in the process of ‘structural transformation’ (Syrquin 1998).  
3  Throughout this paper, our focus will be on the ‘organized’ manufacturing sector. The 
increasing proliferation of ‘unorganized’ manufacturing in recent decades necessitates a separate 
analysis of its evolution and its links with the organized sector through processes of 
ancillarization and subcontracting.  
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contribution to overall growth was made by services: the value added share of services in 
GDP went up from 42.28% to 58.31% between 1984 and 2005 (Kotwal et al. 2011). 
Nevertheless, the organized manufacturing sector in India today is quite 
significant in absolute terms. During 2012-13, the sector consisted of 222,120 factories 
employing 10 million workers. In the same year, the net value added by the sector 
amounted to 8602 billion Indian rupees – approximately 139 billion dollars – that 
accounted for about 10% of India’s GDP (Basu and Das, 2015). The launch of the “Make 
in India” campaign by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2014 indicates that the current 
administration is keen to emphasize the centrality of manufacturing to future economic 
development of the nation. Hence, it is important to have a clear understanding of the 
relative importance of different factors in the evolution of the organized manufacturing 
sector in India. Such an understanding can then inform policy decisions with regard to its 
future trajectory. 
The literature on the evolution of Indian manufacturing industries is vast. In this 
paper, we focus on one particular aspect that has been discussed extensively in the more 
recent policy-oriented literature: the relationship between manufacturing performance 
and labor legislation (Fallon and Lucas 1993; Besley and Burgess 2004; Sanyal and 
Menon 2005; Aghion et al. 2006; Ahsan and Pagés 2009; Kotwal et al. 2011). Within this 
literature, it is possible to identify at least two related but distinct strands that differ with 
respect to their primary object of investigation. 
First, during the early 1990s, one strand of literature developed with the aim of 
explaining the causes and consequences of “jobless growth” in Indian manufacturing 
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during the 1980s. 4  This literature emphasized the role of industrial relations within 
manufacturing units in determining output and employment. However, the climate of 
industrial relations was understood to be depending solely on labor legislation – 
specifically the amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) of 1976 and 1982. The 
central amendment to Chapter V-b of the IDA requiring employers in manufacturing 
establishments with more than 300 workers to acquire government permission before 
“lay-offs” and “retrenchment” was passed in 1976. 5  In 1982, this amendment was 
extended to establishments with 100 workers. The literature that emerged in the 1990s 
emphasized that these amendments made employers averse to hiring workers by making 
it difficult to fire them. The result was jobless growth (Fallon and Lucas 1993).  
The early literature, represented by Fallon and Lucas (1993), used a “before-after” 
framework with regard to legislative changes in 1976 and 1982-84 to investigate the 
effect of industrial relations on manufacturing performance at the industry or all-India 
level. In the post-2000 period, an influential strand of literature has tried to use state-level 
variation in amendments to the IDA to explain the long-run variations in the performance 
of the manufacturing sector across states. The basic argument put forward by this 
literature is that states with a greater pro-worker tilt in labor legislation have fared worse 
in terms of manufacturing outcomes. In particular, it has been argued that pro-worker 
legislation increases the bargaining power of workers and thereby reduces the propensity                                                         
4 “Jobless growth” refers to the fact that while value added in Indian manufacturing grew at 6.3% 
during 1979-87, employment growth was negative and stood at –0.3% (Bhalotra 1998, Table 1). 
5 The IDA defines a layoff as “the failure, refusal or inability of an employer on account of 
shortage of coal, power, or raw materials or the accumulation of stocks or the breakdown of 
machinery or natural calamity or any other connected reason to give employment to a workman 
whose name is borne on the muster rolls of his establishment.” Layoffs are limited to 45 days on 
half pay. On the other hand, retrenchment is defined as “the permanent termination of a worker’s 
service, other than on account of punishment, retirement, ending of a contractual period, or 
continued ill-health” (Bhattacharjea 2009). 
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of employers to invest (Besley and Burgess 2004, pp. 102). However, the empirical 
procedure adopted and evidence marshaled for making such a claim have been criticized 
extensively (Bhattacharjea 2006, 2009; Kotwal 2011). In particular, Bhattacharjea (2006) 
has convincingly argued why the regulatory measure used by Besley and Burgess (2004) 
is flawed. 
In this paper, we revisit the issue of explaining cross-state variations in 
manufacturing performance in terms of the industrial relations climate by focusing 
attention on two important issues. First, as our point of departure, we use the idea that 
intrinsic profitability of industries located in a particular state might be an alternative and 
independent determinant of cross-state variations in manufacturing performance. Second, 
we take Bhattacharjea’s (2006, 2009) methodological critique of Besley and Burgess 
(2004) seriously, and so replace the regulatory measure that they construct with a more 
direct measure of the climate of industrial relations: total number of man-days lost to all 
industrial disputes (strikes and lock-outs).  
What could justify using intrinsic profitability as a valid point of departure for our 
analysis? First, in the past, economists have emphasized the possibility that intrinsic 
profitability matters and that it might be an independent determinant of industrial 
performance. For example, in a paper focusing on the economic performance of the state 
of West Bengal, several prominent economists suggested that more than poor labor 
relations, the decline of the manufacturing sector in the state may have been caused by a 
decline in the “intrinsic profitability of industry in West Bengal” (Banerjee et al. 2002). 
Second, the profit share – a key component of the rate of profit – is a measure of 
distribution of income between employers and workers. Thus, a rising profit share in the 
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organized manufacturing sector, as found by Basu and Das (2015) for the period 1982-83 
to 2012-13, is difficult to reconcile with high or growing bargaining power of labor, 
irrespective of pro-labor legislation. Thus, pro-labor legislation, to the extent it exists, 
might not translate into actual changes in the bargaining power of labor. Hence, using the 
former might lead to a mis-specified empirical model. 
Finally, while the climate of industrial relations might certainly have a bearing on 
manufacturing performance, it might also be correlated with intrinsic profitability (which 
is also a plausible, independent determinant of manufacturing performance). Thus, failure 
to control for profitability while investigating the effect of industrial relations climate on 
manufacturing performance will give rise to biased results owing to an omitted variable 
bias.  
In this paper, we use a state-level panel data set for the period 1969-2005 to 
analyze the relative importance of profitability and industrial relations climate as 
alternative determinants of manufacturing sector performance. Our analysis contributes to 
the extant literature in three ways. First, by econometrically analyzing the effects of 
profitability and industrial relations on manufacturing outcomes, we link together the 
concerns of three different sets of literature. The two literatures on “jobless growth” and 
cross-state variations in manufacturing outcomes have emphasized the role of industrial 
relations only in a narrow manner by focusing solely on labor legislation. More 
important, they have not incorporated profits and surplus distribution into their empirical 
exercises. We address this gap by incorporating profitability measures in our econometric 
model. The third literature that informs our paper is the one on profitability trends in 
Indian manufacturing that has looked at trends in the components of profit rates and their 
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impact on investment but has left industrial relations out of the picture (Sau 1989; Felipe 
and Kumar 2010; Basu and Das 2015; Basu and Das 2016). We enrich the heterodox 
emphasis on the relationship between profitability and investment by explicitly 
accounting for industrial relations.  
Second, our exercise has important policy implications. Based on econometric 
results, the literature focusing on labor legislation (Fallon and Lucas 1993; Besley and 
Burgess 2004; Ahsan and Pagés 2009) has argued that government regulation of labor 
markets has not always promoted social welfare. However, we must not hastily conclude 
that the policy aim should be to dismantle government regulation. Investment and output 
in the organized manufacturing sector certainly depend on profitability, since organized 
manufacturing in India is largely privately owned and capitalist in nature.6 Thus, if our 
results indicate a larger effect of profitability on manufacturing outcomes as compared to 
industrial relations, then removal of government regulation may not be the only or even 
the most important policy prescription.  
Finally, our work can be linked to broader concerns regarding inequality in India, 
particularly in the neoliberal (post-1991) era. Using household level data on monthly 
consumption expenditure from the National Sample Survey (NSS), scholars have found 
that since 1991, inequality has increased between urban elites (such as enterprise owners, 
managers and professionals) and rural rentier classes (such as moneylenders and absentee 
landlords) on the one hand and urban workers, marginal farmers and landless agricultural 
workers on the other (Vakulabharanam 2010). More specifically, using the same NSS 
data, Basole and Basu (2015) have shown that in the post-1991 era, inequality within                                                         
6 See Basu and Das (2016), particularly the introduction, for a good overview of the heterodox 
literature on the relationship between profitability and investment in capitalist enterprises.   
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food and non-food group expenditures has declined, even as overall expenditure 
inequality has increased over time. They have argued that the rise in overall expenditure 
inequality is mainly driven by the share of non-food spending. This tends to be more 
unequal than food spending and has increased rapidly in the average household’s 
consumption basket. Crucially, both Vakulabharanam (2010) and Basole and Basu (2015) 
have suggested that state provision of essential goods can mitigate inequality. 
Specifically, as economic growth picks up, the state can step in and improve public 
provisioning of education, health care, transportation and housing, since these services 
loom large as non-food items in household consumption. To the extent that profitability is 
found to be an important driver of investment in organized manufacturing, it further 
implies a very important role for the state in this regard, since a rising profit share – one 
of the components of the rate of profit – reduces the capacity of workers to access such 
services if they are privately provided. By using the profit rate as our measure of 
profitability, we analyze whether the distribution of income within manufacturing 
enterprises has indeed affected outcomes such as investment, net value added and 
employment. Although we do not analyze such links in detail in this paper, they are 
certainly an important avenue of future investigation. 
Our empirical analysis shows that profitability is a more important determinant of 
industrial performance than industrial disputes. Our preferred specification suggests that 
a 1 per cent increase in the rate of profit is associated with a 0.7, 0.6 and 0.6 per cent 
increases in net value added, investment/capital stock ratio, and the number of workers 
employed. On the other hand, we find that a 1 per cent increase in the man-days lost to all 
industrial disputes is associated with 0.1 per cent declines in net value added and 
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employment but no significant change in the investment/capital stock ratio. To us, this 
suggests that profitability is a more important determinant of industrial performance, both 
because it has numerically stronger effects (than industrial disputes) and because its 
effect is observable across a wider array of measures of industrial performance (than for 
industrial disputes). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we undertake a critical 
review of the relevant literature. Our aim is twofold – to specify the limitations of 
existing work and to emphasize the manner in which we address it with our own 
empirical strategy. In section 3, we discuss details of our empirical strategy; in section 4, 
we discuss our data sources, provide details about the construction of variables and 
discuss the main results of our analysis. The last section concludes the paper with some 
thoughts about future research. 
2. Literature Review 
The role of labor legislation in determining manufacturing sector performance was first 
emphasized during the attempts in the 1990s to explain the “jobless growth” of the 1980s. 
The pioneering study in this field was Fallon and Lucas (1993), who adopted a “before-
and-after” approach to identify the effect of labor legislation on manufacturing sector 
performance. Bhattacharjea (2006) proposes a general empirical model that can capture 
the essential points of the analysis in Fallon and Lucas (1993):  
𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐽𝑡 + 𝛽5�𝐽𝑡 × 𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1� + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
where 𝑖  and 𝑡 indexes industry and year, 𝑁  denotes employment, 𝑋 is a labor demand 
variable (calculated through estimation of labor demand functions), and 𝐽 is a dummy 
variable that switches from zero to one in the year of legislative change. While 
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𝛽3 measures the degree of inertia in the employment adjustment process, 𝛽5 shows how 
the legal change affects the degree of inertia in (1). Using industry-level disaggregated 
data from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) that covered all manufacturing 
establishments employing 50 or more workers for the period 1959-82, Fallon and Lucas 
(1993) found both 𝛽3and 𝛽5 to be insignificant. However, 𝛽4was found to be negative and 
significant, implying the legal changes did cause a significant reduction of 17.5% in 
employment. Hence, Fallon and Lucas (1993) identified job security legislation as the 
key factor causing the phenomenon of jobless growth. However, as argued by Nagaraj 
(1994) and Bhalotra (1998), there are several problems in the Fallon and Lucas (1993) 
analysis. 
First, Fallon and Lucas (1993, pp.263) summarize their estimates as revealing a 
negative coefficient in 25 out of 35 manufacturing industries using a mere 25 percent 
level of significance. They conclude that the average drop in labor demand was 17.5 
percent, but this figure is based on averaging across insignificant coefficients, which is a 
questionable procedure. Second, if the job security regulation had been of great 
importance, we would expect to observe threshold effects at 100 workers during the 
1980s. 7  Instead, employment growth was positive in factories with less than 1000 
workers and negative only in larger ones (Nagaraj 1994).  
A slightly different but related view of jobless growth was the assertion put 
forward by the World Bank (1989, Chapter 4) that the decline in employment during the 
1980s was due to the acceleration in wages, which in turn was due to union-push. In a 
passing reference to employment, Ahluwalia (1991) reinforced this view. Thus, the                                                         
7Since the 1976 amendment was subsequently extended in 1982 (with effect from 1984) to 
establishments consisting of 100 workers. 
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arguments made by Fallon and Lucas (1993) and the World Bank (1989) share an 
emphasis on labor’s bargaining power. The assertion is that job security legislation 
provided greater bargaining power to workers that, in turn, led to a wage-push and 
subsequently to a fall in employment.  
However, if job security made retrenchment harder and led to greater union 
power, it is hard to understand how employers could have fired workers in spite of that.8 
Of course, this is not to deny that job security legislation affects employment decisions. 
Rather, it is to contest the rather simplistic view that such legislation is aimed at, or will 
necessarily lead to, an improved bargaining power of workers. Moreover, using ASI data, 
both Nagaraj (1994) and Bhalotra (1998) have established empirically that despite the fall 
in the number of workers employed, actual man-days worked increased during the 1980s. 
Nagaraj (1994) goes further and argues that if one looks at the growth rates of earnings 
per man-day rather than total earnings per worker, one can even counter the central claim 
of excessive wage growth during the 1980s. This is because earnings per man-day 
increased at a much slower pace, and in certain industries, it grew at rates that were even 
lower than the per capita growth of GDP during the 1980s. Thus, the “accelerating wage” 
argument for jobless growth does not hold up to careful empirical scrutiny. 
Following the important critiques of Nagaraj (1994) and Bhalotra (1998), the 
attempt to understand the role of labor legislation in determining manufacturing 
outcomes took a slightly different turn. The intervention of Besley and Burgess (2004) 
has been influential in this regard. They exploited state-level variation in the direction of 
                                                        
8 Bhalotra (1998) notes that a number of micro-studies found evidence of considerable evasion 
and bypassing of the law by firms (with the help of innovative methods).  
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amendments made to the IDA during the period 1947-92 for their analysis.9 First, they 
classified amendments as pro-worker, neutral or pro-employer, assigning scores of +1, 0 
and –1 respectively to each state for the relevant year. Second, they cumulated these 
scores over time to obtain a “regulatory index” for each state in each year. Finally, they 
used this index, along with control variables, to explain (with a one-year lag) state-level 
output per capita and employment in the organized manufacturing sector using a panel 
data set for 1958-92. They found that regulation in a pro-worker direction adversely 
affected two crucial outcomes – output and employment – for registered manufacturing. 
At the same time, pro-labor legislation promoted output in unregistered manufacturing. 
This led them to conclude that the domain of regulation – organized manufacturing – was 
indeed severely affected by amendments that improved the relative bargaining power of 
labor. However, the Besley and Burgess (BB) approach can be criticized on three 
separate grounds – the theoretical argument regarding the link between labor legislation 
and manufacturing performance, the suitability of the regulatory index as a measure of 
the industrial relations climate, and the econometric method.10 
First, the arguments in BB do not provide much in the way of explaining why pro-
labor legislation should lead to poor manufacturing performance. In a short section titled                                                         
9 Although the IDA was initially passed in 1947 as a Central Act, provincial governments had the 
authority to pass amendments as they deemed fit. This is what allows Besley and Burgess (2004) 
to analyze the relationship between state-level variations in labor legislation and manufacturing 
performance. 
10 It should be mentioned here that a number of studies have used variants of the regulatory index 
proposed by BB for different purposes. For example, Sanyal and Menon (2005) have used it to 
analyze the location of private investment across states while Aghion et al. (2006) have analyzed 
the interaction between delicensing of industries and labor legislation. Ahsan and Pagés (2009) 
have updated the BB index by disaggregating amendments into various classes and recoding 
some amendments in accordance with the suggestions of Bhattacharjea (2006). Since these 
studies follow the same general approach as BB and since our focus is on pointing out the 
limitations of that approach and suggesting an alternative econometric exercise, we do not discuss 
these studies in detail. Interested readers may refer to the comprehensive and insightful reviews 
of Shyam Sundar (2005) and Bhattacharjea (2006, 2009).   
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“Theoretical Considerations,” they mention two effects that are relevant for their analysis 
– a relative price effect and an expropriation effect. The relative price effect implies that 
pro-labor legislation will “raise the (fixed or marginal) cost of employing laborers” (BB 
2004: 101). This will lead either to a rise in the capital-labor ratio or lower the firm’s 
optimal output by increasing the marginal cost of production. The expropriation effect 
means that over time, if labor’s bargaining power goes up, there will be lower returns on 
investment for employers as labor “expropriates” a larger portion of the rent or surplus. 
Thus, the key issue emphasized by BB is the possible increase in the relative bargaining 
power of workers due to pro-worker legislation.  
Theoretically, the assertion that a relative price effect will lead to a rise in the 
capital-labor ratio conveniently assumes that the cost of capital (real interest rate) is 
constant. Empirically, there is no evidence to show that the “fixed or marginal cost of 
employing laborers” has gone up in manufacturing industries over time. Using a subset of 
the total organized manufacturing sector with data running from 1969 to 1986, Sau 
(1989) found a non-declining trend of the profit rate in India.  More recently, using 
aggregate data from the Annual Survey of Industries, Basu and Das (2015) have analyzed 
the trends in both the profit rate and its different components – the profit share, the 
capacity utilization ratio and the capacity-capital ratio – in India’s organized 
manufacturing sector between 1982-83 and 2012-13. Over the whole period of analysis, 
they have found that the rate of profit grew at about 1 percent per annum, primarily 
driven by a rising share of profits. As mentioned earlier, the analyses of Nagaraj (1994) 
and Bhalotra (1998) also cast doubt on the wage-push explanation of jobless growth 
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during 1980s. Thus, for the entire period of analysis in our paper, there seems to be little 
evidence of a relative price effect of a rise in labor’s bargaining power.  
Regarding the expropriation of surplus by labor, the assertion by BB assumes that 
capitalists and workers have identical fallback positions. However, the fallback position 
of workers is crucially determined by factors such as the current levels of unemployment, 
inflation and the availability of credit and by the simple fact that the workers in 
manufacturing industries often have factory-specific skills that are of little or no use 
outside it. Thus, as Bhattacharjea (2006: 20) suggests, it would have been more 
appropriate to consider the reverse possibility – of capitalists expropriating a greater 
surplus from workers. Indeed, the rising profit share found by Basu and Das (2015) 
demonstrates the realization of such a possibility. In our own econometric exercise, we 
incorporate the profit rate as an explanatory variable to analyze the effects of the 
distribution of surplus within manufacturing establishments on net value added, 
investment and employment.  
Second, although the theoretical emphasis by BB is on bargaining power, it is 
doubtful whether their regulatory index is a good measure of the same. In an important 
footnote, Besley and Burgess (2004: 99) mention that their index is highly correlated to 
the actual number of man-days lost to industrial disputes (strikes and lockouts); and this 
result is robust to the inclusion of state-specific time-trends unlike their other results. 
However, as Bhattacharjea (2006) points out, the basis for this relationship between de 
jure and de facto industrial relations is unclear. More importantly, careful empirical 
scrutiny reveals that this relationship is certainly tenuous at best if one undertakes a more 
disaggregated analysis. For example, as BB candidly admit, most of the amendments they 
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study were passed post-1977. A quick count confirms that before 1976 (when the first 
Central amendment to the IDA was passed), only 31 out of the 113 state-level 
amendments studied were passed. Among them, only 5 were pro-labor and 3 of those 
were passed in Rajasthan, a state that is classified as pro-employer after the final 
cumulation. However, as various authors have noted (Rao 1995; Bhattacharjee 2001), it 
was precisely during the period 1965-1976 – the worst period of industrial slowdown – 
that industrial disputes (particularly strikes) were at their peak. This is an important 
anomaly that also suggests the possibility of bi-directional causality between industrial 
performance and disputes.  This discrepancy between legislation and actual occurrence of 
disputes is carried over to the decade of the 1980s, when the majority of pro-labor 
amendments were passed. Surprisingly however, it was precisely during the 1980s that 
the share of lockouts in man-days lost to industrial dispute increased sharply (Shyam 
Sundar 2004; Bhattacharjee 2001). As mentioned before, the empirical claim of rising 
wages can be countered if one follows Nagaraj (1994) to argue that earnings per man-day 
did not witness a significant increase. Finally, the gap between legislation and outcomes 
is at its starkest if one looks at the 1990s. The last state-level amendment to the IDA was 
passed in 1989. If legislation were the sole cause of changes in relative bargaining power, 
then at the very least we would not expect to see any further changes in the composition 
of industrial disputes. However, as data from the Indian Labor Yearbook clearly shows, 
the share of lockouts in industrial disputes continued to steadily increase during the 
1990s11.  
                                                        
11 As an aside, it should be noted that most studies analyzing the trend of growth rates in Indian 
manufacturing have found a structural break in the late 1970s or early 1980s (Kotwal 2011). 
Admittedly, the trend is for the whole of India while BB are trying to explain cross-state 
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These anomalies probably follow from the problems in the construction of the BB 
index that Bhattacharjea (2006, 2009) points out – inappropriate classification, a lack of 
consideration of the relative importance of each amendment and a misleading cumulation 
over time. Indeed, these problems together lead to the curious classification of the state of 
Gujarat as pro-labor and the southern state of Kerala – one that is known for its social-
democratic outlook and pro-poor policies – as pro-employer. Bhattacharjea (2009) also 
points out many examples to show that the extremely convoluted and tardy legal system 
in India means that it is almost impossible to say with any degree of certainty when 
exactly an amendment became operative in a particular state. All of this raises the 
question – what exactly does the BB regulatory measure capture? According to 
Bhattacharjea (2006: 32) –  
“…it seems to capture, for the early 1980s, the inter-state variation in 
some amalgam of labor regulation, industrial relations, and the investment 
climate.”  
Thus, it is not clear that the BB index is a good measure of labor’s bargaining power, 
which is the cornerstone of their overall argument.  
Therefore, in order to avoid the pitfalls of the BB index, we use a more direct 
measure of the climate of industrial relations: the actual quantum of man-days lost to 
strikes and lockouts in various states (normalized by employment). While this solves the 
problems associated with the BB index, it raises another challenge: the possibility of 
endogeneity. It is plausible to argue that there is a bi-directional causal relationship 
between manufacturing sector performance and industrial disputes (lockout and strikes).                                                                                                                                                                      
variations in manufacturing performance. Nevertheless, this observation does not sit well with the 
fact that the lion’s share of pro-labor legislation was passed in the 1980s.   
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While a rise in industrial disputes might be expected to have a negative impact on 
manufacturing performance due to disruption in production, it is equally plausible to 
allow for a reverse causal effect. When there is slowdown or stagnation, the size of the 
pie shrinks and the struggle over its division – between capitalists and workers – becomes 
more acute. In a similar manner, industrial performance might also have a causal effect 
on profitability. It is possible that robust and high growth might provide incentives for 
firms to upgrade their technology and thereby enhance profitability. We address the valid 
concern of endogeneity in two different ways.  
First, we use a flexible lead-lag specification to control for the possible causal 
impact on industrial performance on industrial disputes and profitability. This method 
controls for the possible impact of current industrial performance on future industrial 
disputes and profitability, and thereby blocks off the possible endogeneity arising from 
autocorrelation in the time series of industrial disputes and profitability. Second, we use a 
dynamic panel data model – with a lag of the dependent variable – as an alternative way 
of addressing the possible feedback from industrial performance to industrial disputes 
and profitability. We use the system GMM estimator to deal not only with the Nickel 
(1981) bias in such a setting but also possible contemporaneous reverse causal effects 
running from industrial performance to industrial disputes and profitability. 
Finally, Bhattacharjea (2006, 2009) has also questioned the robustness of BB’s 
econometric model. Specifically he has criticized the fact that BB use only the following 
control variables – a state’s development expenditure, installed electricity generation 
capacity per capita, population and ruling political parties, as well as state and year fixed 
effects. He has argued that more indicators of state-level infrastructure and human capital 
 18 
should be included in the regression. In our econometric model, we address this lacuna by 
including several relevant control variables. As a measure of infrastructure, we continue 
to use installed electricity generation capacity per capita; as measures of the labor supply 
and (indicators of) its quality, we use the total population, literacy rate and social sector 
expenditure (health, education and other basic amenities) by state governments; and as 
indicators of the overall economic and political environment in a state, we use the per 
capita real net state domestic product (NSDP) and an index of ideological orientation of 
the coalition of political parties running state governments.  
3. Empirical Strategy 
3.1. Econometric Model 
To test the relative importance of profitability and the climate of industrial relations in 
explaining the variation of manufacturing sector performance across Indian states, we use 
the following econometric model log𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 log𝜋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 log 𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜸𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛼 × 𝜙𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (2) 
where 𝑖  and 𝑡  indexes states and years, 𝑌𝑖𝑡  is a measure of manufacturing sector 
performance, 𝜋𝑖𝑡 is a measure of intrinsic profitability, 𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 is a measure of the climate of 
industrial relations, 𝑿𝒊𝒕 is a vector of control variables, 𝜇𝑖 are state fixed effects, 𝛿𝑡 are 
year fixed effects, 𝜙𝑖𝑡  denote state-specific linear time trends, and 𝑢𝑖𝑡  refers to an 
unobserved stochastic error term. 
 For the analysis in this paper, we use three alternative measures of manufacturing 
sector performance as the dependent variable in (2): net value added, investment 
(normalized with the stock of fixed capital), and total workers employed. The key 
independent variables in (2) are profitability and the climate of industrial relations. We 
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measure profitability by the rate of profit (flow of profit income divided by the 
replacement cost value of the stock of fixed capital), a standard measure used in the 
heterodox literature (see, for instance, Basu and Das, 2016). Our measure of the climate 
of industrial relations is the man-days lost to industrial disputes per worker, where 
industrial disputes refer to lockouts and strikes. Our primary interest is in the parameters, 
𝛽1 and 𝛽2 in (2), which measure the partial effect of profitability and industrial disputes, 
respectively, on manufacturing sector performance.  
To control for the effects of variables that might be correlated with manufacturing 
performance and with profitability and/or the climate of industrial relations, we include 
several control variables. To control for the state-level variation in infrastructure that is 
relevant for manufacturing sector performance, we include the installed capacity for 
electricity generation. This is motivated by the fact that we study the organized 
manufacturing sector, which uses electrical power as the key power input for its 
operations. To control for the general level of economic development, we include the real 
per capita NSDP. Among other things, it controls for the effect of aggregate demand on 
profitability and manufacturing sector performance. To make sure that our results are not 
confounded by any systematic variation in the size of states, we include the state-level 
population as a control. The level and quality of human capital can be an important 
determinant of manufacturing sector performance, but also of industrial disputes and 
profitability. Hence, we include the adult literacy rate and the total social sector 
expenditure per capita by state governments to control for these factors. Finally, to 
control for the possible impact of the ideological orientation of ruling parties or coalitions 
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in state governments as a confounding factor, we include an index of political party 
ideology.    
The model in (2) also includes state and year fixed effects. The former control for 
state-level, slowly-changing unobserved factors that could be correlated with 
manufacturing performance and profitability or industrial disputes, like cultural factors, 
attitudes of state-level bureaucracy, etc. The latter, year fixed effects, control for temporal 
shocks that would affect all states at any point in time, like global oil price shocks. We 
estimate the model in (2) with and without a full set of state-specific linear time trends. 
This is motivated by the fact that the results in BB were completely washed out as soon 
as state-specific trends were included (Besley and Burgess, 2004, column 4, Table IV). 
To make sure that our results are not confounded by the effect of any pre-existing state 
level trends, we report results that include state-specific linear trends in the model in (2). 
Thus, identification of the effect of profitability and industrial disputes in (2), in such 




The data set used for the analysis in this paper is an unbalanced panel on the organized 
manufacturing sector for sixteen major states of India over the period 1969-2005. We 
assemble this state-level panel data set from different sources, details of which are 
available in the Appendix. We use three outcome variables for capturing manufacturing 
sector performance in the econometric model in (2): net value added, fixed investment (as 
a proportion of the replacement cost stock of fixed capital), and total number of workers. 
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Data on these three variables come from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) and 
Besley and Burgess (2017), with the replacement cost capital stock series constructed 
using the methodology in Basu and Das (2016). 
 The key independent variables in our model in (2) are the climate of industrial 
relations and profitability. We use the total man-days lost to industrial disputes (strikes 
and lockouts) as our measure of the climate of industrial relations. Data on this variable 
comes from various issues of the Indian Labor Statistics and the Indian Labor Yearbook, 
both published by the Government of India. We measure profitability with the rate of 
profit, which is defined as the ratio of the flow of profit income over a year and the 
beginning-of-year stock of fixed capital (valued at replacement cost). These data also 
come from Besley and Burgess (2017) and the ASI. 
 Data on our control variables come from various sources. Data on total installed 
electricity capacity generation comes from Statistical Abstracts of India. Data on per 
capita real NSDP (2004-05 prices) come from the Handbook of Statistics on Indian 
Economy, an annual publication of the Reserve Bank of India. Data on state-level 
population is taken from the Economic Survey, an annual flagship publication of the 
Ministry of Finance, Government of India. Data on the adult literacy rate come from the 
Open Government Data Platform India. We construct the index of ideology of state 
governments using the methodology outlined in Barenberg, Basu and Soylu (2016, 
section 3.1). 
[Table 1 about here] 
 Table 1 provides summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis in this 
paper. The logarithm of net value added (measured in units of crore, 10 million, of 
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rupees) for the organized manufacturing sector varies, for the entire sample of state-years, 
from -1.09 to 11.61, with a mean value of 7.35; similarly, the logarithm of investment 
(measured as percentage of the fixed capital stock) varies from -2.07 to 6.80; and, the 
logarithm of the number of employed workers varies from -2.90 to 7.21. The logarithm of 
man-days lost to industrial disputes per worker varies from -0.21 to 15.87, with a mean 
value of 7.62. The logarithm of the profit rate varies from -7.29 to 6.02, with a mean 
value of 3.26. These data suggest a huge variation across state-years in manufacturing 
sector performance, industrial disputes and profitability. It is clear from Table 1 that all 
the control variables also display significant variation across state-years. This allows us 
to use the variation across states and years to estimate causal impact, to which we now 
turn. 
 
4.2. Main Results 
The main results of our analysis are summarized in Table 2 through 4. Table 2 reports 
results of estimating the model in (2), where the dependent variable is the logarithm of 
net value added; in Table 3 and 4, we present results of estimating the same model, but 
with the log of investment (normalized by the stock of fixed capital) and the log of the 
number of workers, respectively, as dependent variables. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
4.2.1. Net Value Added as Measure of Industrial Performance: Basic Results 
The first column of Table 2 presents estimates for a stripped down version of the model 
in (2) with log of net value added as the dependent variable. In this version, the only 
regressors are the measure of industrial climate (logarithm of man-days lost to all 
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industrial disputes per worker) and profitability (logarithm of the rate of profit), apart 
from state and year fixed effects. The coefficient on profitability is positive and 
statistically significant at the 0.1 per cent level; the coefficient on industrial disputes is 
negative and significant at the 1 per cent level. In column 2, we add the full set of 
controls: log of per capita net state domestic product (in fixed prices), log of the adult 
literacy rate, log of the installed electricity generation capacity, log of the population, and 
an index for the ideological orientation of the state government. When we add these 
controls, the coefficient on profitability increases a little and remains strongly significant; 
similarly, the coefficient on industrial disputes remains negative (and larger in absolute 
value) and significant.  
Column 3 includes the full set of controls, state and year fixed effects and state-
specific time trends. The coefficient on profitability is 0.672 and is statistically significant 
at the 0.1 per cent level. This means that a 1 per cent increase in the rate of profit is 
associated with a 0.672 per cent increase in the net value added. The coefficient on 
industrial disputes is -0.115 and statistically significant at the 0.1 per cent level. Thus, a 
rise in man-days lost to industrial disputes by 1 per cent is associated with a 0.115 per 
cent decline in net value added. These results show that profitability is quantitatively 
more important in determining industrial performance – measured by net value added – 
than industrial climate – measured by the man-days lost to industrial disputes per worker.   
4.2.1. Net Value Added as Measure of Industrial Performance: Addressing 
Concerns of Endogeneity 
While the basic result presented in the first three columns of Table 2 show that 
profitability is a more important determinant of industrial performance than industrial 
disputes, there can be valid concerns about endogeneity. It is plausible that industrial 
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performance – net value added – has a reverse causal effect on both industrial disputes 
and profitability. Industrial growth, by increasing the size of the pie, can reduce the 
likelihood of industrial conflict between employers and workers. Moreover, industrial 
performance can boost profitability through both demand and supply channels, a larger 
market and technological upgradation, for instance. To address concerns of endogeneity 
giving us biased estimates, we estimate two other specifications and report their results in 
columns 4 through 7 in Table 2. 
 In columns 4 and 5, we try to address the possible problem of reverse causality by 
including 1-lag and 1-lead of both industrial disputes and profitability in the basic model 
estimated in column 3:  
log𝑌𝑖𝑡 = � 𝛽1𝑗 log𝜋𝑖,𝑡−𝑗1
𝑗=−1
+ � 𝛽2𝑗 log 𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑡−𝑗1
𝑗=−1
+ 
                                    𝜸𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛼 × 𝜙𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡   (3) 
While the lags are meant to capture possible delayed impacts of industrial disputes and 
profitability on industrial performance, the leads are meant to block the reverse causal 
channel that operated in a temporal sequence, i.e., industrial performance in the current 
period has an impact on industrial disputes and profitability in the next period. If 
industrial performance has a causal impact on industrial conflict (and profitability) in the 
temporal sequence sense, then that effect is likely to be picked up by the correlation 
between net value added in a period and industrial disputes (and profitability) in the next 
period. Since industrial disputes (and profitability) is likely to be persistent, this would 
make the error term correlated with industrial disputes (and profitability) and lead to an 
omitted variable bias. Including the lead of industrial disputes (and profitability) is meant 
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to address this possibility. The basic result in column 3 remains valid in columns 4 and 5, 
but with a difference: the rate of profit has a positive and statistically significant impact 
on net value added, but the negative impact of industrial disputes is both numerically 
small and statistically weak.  
 While the results in columns 4 and 5 address concerns about endogeneity when 
they operate through temporal sequencing, the possibility of contemporaneous correlation 
between industrial performance and disputes (and profitability) remains a possible 
concern. To address this concern, we report results from estimating a dynamic panel data 
model in columns 6 and 7 of Table 2 of the following form: 
log𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 log𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 + �𝛽1𝑗 log𝜋𝑖,𝑡−𝑗1
𝑗=0
+ �𝛽2𝑗 log 𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑡−𝑗1
𝑗=0
+ 
                                    𝜸𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛼 × 𝜙𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡   (4) 
 
In model (4), we include 1-lag of the dependent variable in the basic model in (2) and 
also include 1-lag each of industrial disputes and profitability. The lag of the dependent 
variable is crucial and is meant to address two issues: first, it will capture the possible 
inertia in industrial performance (as emphasized in Fallon and Lucas (1993) and Bhalotra 
(1998)), and second, it will address concerns of reverse causality because it will capture 
the correlation between net value added in a period and industrial disputes (and 
profitability) in the next period. On the other hand, the lags of industrial disputes and 
profitability are meant to allow for delayed effects of these factors on industrial 
performance. While the model in (4) is useful to address the reverse causal channel from 
net value added to industrial disputes and profitability in a flexible manner, it adds a 
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complication: the state fixed effects will be correlated with the lagged dependent 
variable, giving rise to Nickel (1981) bias.  
To address this problem, we estimate the model with system GMM – the 
Blundell-Bond estimator for dynamic panel data models (Blundell and Bond, 1998). This 
method allows us to treat net value added (1-lag), industrial disputes and the rate of profit 
as endogenous, and uses two sets of internally generated instruments for GMM 
estimation: (1) first difference of net value added (1-lag), industrial disputes and the rate 
of profit as instruments in the levels equation; and (2) levels of net value added (1-lag), 
industrial disputes and the rate of profit as instruments in the difference equation. The 
results in columns 6 (without state-specific time trends) and 7 (with state-specific time 
trends) show that our basic results remain valid. The rate of profit has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on net value added – the coefficient is slightly higher than 
in previous columns. On the other hand, industrial disputes have a negative but 
numerically small (and statistically weaker) effect on net value added. The model with 
state specific time trends in column 7 of Table 2 is our preferred specification and shows 
that while a 1 per cent increase in the rate of profit is associated with a 0.655 per cent 
increase in net value added, a 1 per cent increase in man-days lost to industrial disputes 
reduces net value added by only 0.097 per cent. 
 
4.2.3. Investment and Employment as Measures of Industrial Performance 
In Tables 3 and 4, we report results that are similar to those reported in Table 2 but with 
different measures of industrial performance: in Table 3, we use log of the investment-




[Table 3 about here] 
 
 The results in Table 3 are similar to those reported in Table 2 but with one major 
difference: industrial disputes are not a significant determinant of investment. We see the 
following pattern across all specifications: the rate of profit has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on investment; industrial disputes have a negative (or even positive) but 
statistically weak effect on investment. For our preferred specification using a linear 
dynamic panel data model (with state-specific time trends) in column 7, we see that a 1 
per cent increase in the rate of profit is associated with a 0.595 per cent rise in the 
investment-capital stock ratio, and the effect is statistically significant at the 0.1 per cent 
level. On the other hand, changes in the man-days lost to industrial disputes have no 
statistically significant effect on investment.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
 In Table 4, we report results with log of the number of workers as the dependent 
variable (the measure of industrial performance). We see that the effect of the rate of 
profit on employment (number of workers) is quantitatively similar in magnitude and 
statistically similar in levels of significance to those reported in Table 2 and 3. Similarly, 
the effect of industrial disputes on employment of workers is also similar to those 
reported in Table 2. For our preferred specification in using a linear dynamic panel data 
model (with state-specific time trends) in column 7, we see that a 1 per cent increase in 
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the rate of profit is associated with a 0.561 per cent increase in the number of workers, 
and the result is statistically significant at the 0.1 per cent level. On the other hand, the 
effect of industrial disputes is negative: a 1 per cent increase in industrial disputes (man-
days lost to industrial disputes) is associated with a 0.092 per cent decrease in the number 
of workers, and this effect is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level.  
5. Conclusion 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to take up the suggestion in Banerjee 
et al. (2002) seriously that what they call “intrinsic profitability” might be an independent 
and important factor to explain differential industrial performance across Indian states, in 
addition to or in place of the climate of industrial relations. Following their suggestion 
and connecting with a literature in heterodox macroeconomics, in this paper we have 
investigated the relative importance of the climate of industrial relations (measured as the 
total man-days lost to all industrial disputes) and profitability (measured as the rate of 
profit on the stock of fixed capital) on industrial performance across Indian states. Our 
analysis uses an unbalanced state-level panel data set from 1969 to 2005 for 16 major 
states. We find that profitability is a much more significant factor in explaining the 
variation of industrial performance – measured by net value added, investment/capital 
stock ratio, and total number of workers – across India’s states than industrial disputes.  
Our baseline specifications suggest that a 1 per cent increase in the rate of profit is 
associated with a 0.7 per cent increase in net value added, a 0.6 per cent increase in 
investment/capital stock, and a 0.6 per cent increase in the number of workers employed. 
All the three effects are statistically significantly different from zero. On the other hand, 
we find that a 1 per cent increase in the man-days lost to all industrial disputes is 
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associated with a decline in net value added of 0.1 per cent, an insignificant change in 
investment/capital stock, and a decline of employment of workers by 0.1 per cent. This 
suggests that profitability is a more important determinant of industrial performance than 
the climate of industrial relations – the effect of the latter on investment is insignificant 
and on output and employment is numerically much smaller than the corresponding 
effects of profitability. 
We would like to end by pointing out a possible weakness of the empirical 
analysis in this paper, and an avenue of future research. We have attempted to address 
concerns about endogeneity with two strategies: a lead-lag specification and a dynamic 
panel method. While these methods seem reasonable, it would be useful to try out other 
approaches for dealing with the possible problems of reverse causality. We explored one 
alternative approach to this issue by using two instruments for industrial disputes: 
unionization rate (log of the number of union members), and the inflation rate in the 
consumer price index for industrial workers (CPIIW). But these instruments turned out to 
be “weak” and so we did not report them in the paper – because weak instruments can 
increase the bias in the parameter estimates. Data on unionization is lacking for many 
state-years and when available it is not of good quality. Hence, other instruments need to 
be explored, something we have not been able to do in this paper.   
To the extent that the results in this paper are reliable estimates of true effects, we 
show that profitability is an important determinant of industrial performance across 
states. Thus, the reason West Bengal has declined and Maharashtra has progressed in 
industrial development might have less to do with the climate of industrial relations than 
with profitability. Thus, an immediate question that calls for investigation is this: what 
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are the important determinants of profitability of industrial firms across Indian states? 
Answering this question will enable the undertaking of a more meaningful approach 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Pooled Sample 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
Log Net Value Added (Rs. Crore) 7.35 1.91 -1.09 11.61 570 
Log Investment/Capital Stock (%) 2.48 0.91 -2.07 6.80 455 
Log Workers (Thousands) 5.55 1.06 -2.90 7.21 570 
Log Man-days Lost Due to Industrial Disputes 
Per Worker 7.62 1.43 -0.21 15.87 554 
Log (Rate of Profit (%)) 3.26 0.73 -7.29 6.02 518 
Log Per Capita Real NSDP (2004-05 Rupees) 9.74 0.68 5.97 12.27 647 
Log Installed Electricity Generation Capacity 
(Thousand Kilowatts) 7.56 0.97 3.50 9.50 390 
Log Population (Thousands) 9.85 1.58 5.35 11.83 621 
Log Literacy Rate (% of Adults) 3.96 0.34 2.88 4.54 620 
Index of Ideology of State Government 2.73 1.00 0.00 5.00 662 
Source: Authors' Calculation. 
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Table 2: Effect of Industrial Disputes and Rate of Profit on Net Value Added 
        Dependent Variable: Log Net Value Added 
       
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Log Industrial Disputes (Man-days Lost) -0.105** -0.151*** -0.115*** -0.037* -0.001 -0.116** -0.097** 
 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.890) (0.001) (0.002) 
Log (Rate of Profit) 0.577*** 0.613*** 0.672*** 0.137** 0.178*** 0.639*** 0.655*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls 
 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 







Leads and Lags of Disputes, Rate of Profit 
   
Y Y 
  1-Lag Dependent Variable: System GMM 
     
Y Y 
Observations 505 314 314 304 304 308 308 
Notes. Controls: log real per capita net domestic product, log of the adult literacy rate, log of installed capacity for electricity generation, log of population, an index 
of ideology of state governments. The models in (1) through (5) have been estimated with OLS, and model (6) and (7) has been estimated with system GMM. P-
values, clustered by state, appear in parentheses below parameter estimates. Significance levels: *** < 0.001, ** < 0.01, * <0.05.   
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Table 3: Effect of Industrial Disputes and Rate of Profit on Investment 
        Dependent Variable: Log Investment/Capital Stock 
      
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Log Industrial Disputes (Man-days Lost) 0.016 -0.015 0.021 0.013 -0.001 -0.003 0.046 
 
(0.683) (0.811) (0.686) (0.819) (0.991) (0.965) (0.471) 
Log (Rate of Profit) 0.708** 0.963*** 1.136*** 1.113*** 1.167*** 0.519*** 0.595*** 
 
(0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls 
 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 







Leads and Lags of Disputes, Rate of Profit 
   
Y Y 
  1-Lag Dependent Variable: System GMM 
     
Y Y 
Observations 441 262 262 257 257 221 221 
Notes. Controls: log real per capita net domestic product, log of the adult literacy rate, log of installed capacity for electricity generation, log of population, an 
index of ideology of state governments. The models in (1) through (5) have been estimated with OLS, and model (6) and (7) has been estimated with system 
GMM. P-values, clustered by state, appear in parentheses below parameter estimates. Significance levels: *** < 0.001, ** < 0.01, * <0.05.   
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Table 4: Effect of Industrial Disputes and Rate of Profit on Number of Workers 
        Dependent Variable: Log Number of Workers 
      
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Log Industrial Disputes (Man-days Lost) -0.119* -0.162*** -0.141*** -0.053* -0.036** -0.092** -0.092** 
 
(0.027) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) 
Log (Rate of Profit) 0.370* 0.472*** 0.529*** 0.005 0.014 0.577*** 0.561*** 
 
(0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.921) (0.597) (0.000) (0.000) 
State Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls 
 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 







Leads and Lags of Disputes, Rate of Profit 
   
Y Y 
  1-Lag Dependent Variable: System GMM 
     
Y Y 
Observations 505 314 314 304 304 308 308 
Notes. Controls: log real per capita net domestic product, log of the adult literacy rate, log of installed capacity for electricity generation, log of population, an 
index of ideology of state governments. The models in (1) through (5) have been estimated with OLS, and model (6) and (7) has been estimated with system 
GMM. P-values, clustered by state, appear in parentheses below parameter estimates. Significance levels: *** < 0.001, ** < 0.01, * <0.05.  
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Appendix: Data Sources and Construction of Variables 
The unbalanced panel dataset used for the analysis in this paper were constructed from 
many different sources. For the 37-year period 1969-2005, we cover the following 
sixteen major states of India – Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Jammu 
& Kashmir, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, 
Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. In 2001, three more states – Jharkhand, 
Chattisgarh and Uttarakhand were created from the erstwhile states of Bihar, Madhya 
Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh respectively. We have merged the post-2001 observations for 
the corresponding states to get a consistent series for sixteen states for the entire period 
1969-2005.  
For our measures of industrial performance – net value added, investment/capital 
stock, and number of workers employed – the primary source of data is the Indian Annual 
Survey of Industries (ASI). The ASI is one of the most reliable sources of information 
regarding various aspects of the manufacturing sector in India and has been conducted 
every year by the Central Statistical Office (CSO) of the Government of India since 1959 
(except 1972). The ASI covers all factories registered under sections 2(m)(i) and 2(m)(ii) 
of the Factories Act of 1948 wherein a factory, the primary statistical unit of 
enumeration, is defined as any premise where a manufacturing process is carried out by 
10 or more workers working with the aid of power, or 20 or more workers working 
without power. The ASI sample is divided into two parts – a census sector and a sample 
(or factory) sector. The census sector involves full enumeration covering all industrial 
units in 5 less industrially developed states – Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Tripura, 
and Andaman & Nicobar Islands – and all units having 100 or more workers in the other 
 38 
states and union territories (UTs). The sample sector involves stratified random sampling 
of units in states other than those considered industrially less developed.  
Our data on Net Value Added (NVA) is from the ASI and is defined as the 
increment to the value of goods and services that is contributed by a factory and is 
obtained by deducting the value of total inputs and depreciations from the value of 
output. For the years 1980-2008, we have used the data on the factory sector directly 
from ASI publications. For the period 1969-1979, we have used the data collated by 
Besley and Burgess (2004) and made available online by the Economic Organisation and 
the Public Policy Programme (EOPP) of the London School of Economics and Political 
Science (Besley and Burgess, 2017).  
Data on employment has also been taken from the ASI. We use the data on the 
total number of workers as our measure of employment. Again, for the period 1980-2008, 
we have obtained the numbers directly from ASI publications and for 1969-1979, we use 
the data from the EOPP website.  
Finally, for our third dependent variable – investment – we use slightly different 
measures for two different periods. For 1980-2005, we measure investment as the ratio of 
net fixed capital formation (NFCF) and the stock of fixed capital (at the beginning of the 
period). The data on NFCF comes from the ASI, which also reports the stock of fixed 
capital on the basis of historical cost valuation. We use the following recursion to 
compute replacement cost capital stock: K(t + 1) = K(t) × [P(t)/P(t-1)]+ I(t),  where K(t) 
is the value of replacement cost capital stock at the beginning of period t, I(t) is the net 
fixed capital formation over period t, and P(t) is the value of the national wholesale price 
index for machines and machinery (WPIMM) in period t. In the initial period, t = 0, K(0) 
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is the historical cost value of capital stock. This methodology has previously been used in 
Basu and Das (2016). Unfortunately, since the data on NFCF is not available for the 
preceding years, for 1969-1979, we measure investment as the change in fixed capital 
stock every year. Again, we calculate the fixed capital stock at replacement cost using the 
WPIMM. The data on the stock of fixed capital for the period 1969-1979 comes from the 
EOPP website. The data on the WPIMM for the entire period 1969-2005 comes from the 
Office of the Economic Adviser, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India. 
The independent variable that captures the industrial relations climate is the total 
number of man-days lost in industrial disputes. Data on this variable comes from various 
issues of the Indian Labor Statistics and the Indian Labor Yearbook, both published by 
the Labor Bureau, Ministry of Labor and Employment, Government of India.  
We measure profitability using the rate of profit, which is computed as the ratio of 
profit income and the stock of fixed capital (measured in replacement cost) at the 
beginning of the year. We calculate profit income as the difference between Net Value 
Added and Wages of productive workers. Data for these variables come from the EOPP 
website (1969-1989) and the ASI (1980-2005). 
For our control variables, the sources are as follows: data on total installed 
electricity generation capacity were taken from the Statistical Abstracts of India, Central 
Statistical Office, Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning, Government of India; 
data on per capita real NSDP (at 2004-05 prices) are taken from the Handbook of 
Statistics of Indian Economy, an annual publication of the Reserve Bank of India; data on 
state-level population for Census years are taken from various issues of the Economic 
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Survey, the annual flagship publication of the Ministry of Finance, Government of India – 
for other years, data was generated with linear interpolation; data on the index of 
ideology was taken from Barenberg, Basu and Soylu (2016).   
 
